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The terrorist attack of September 11
th posed an unprecedented challenge to the survival of 
organizations in Lower Manhattan. In this paper we consider the key mechanisms of 
resilience exhibited by one surviving company. We examine the case of an investment bank 
located next to the World Trade Center whose trading room, data and technology were 
destroyed in the attack. Its traders survived, but were forced to relocate to New Jersey and 
restore their trading technology. We find  that the crisis unfolded in a complex, 
unpredictable manner: whereas the technical difficulties were overcome, differences in 
identity among the traders placed the company at the brink of disintegration. The trading 
room did not face one crisis – the immediate aftermath of September 11
th – but many.  A 
given crisis was resolved by restoring identities; but identities, once restored, redefined the 
situation and lead to new crises. That is, the successive waves of crisis were produced by 
each success in managing crisis.  The organization held together through a leadership style 
that managed ambiguities, rebuilt identities, assuaged fears, and restored the initiative of 
organizational actors, creating the conditions for new solutions to emerge.     2 
 
Resolving Identities: 
Successive Crises in a Trading Room after 9/11 
 






So accustomed have we grown to the image of the World Trade Center as a facade, two tall 
rectangles cut against the skyline of Manhattan, that we are usually unaware that it is only 
the outsides of the buildings that are displayed to us. In the countless media representations, 
rarely do we see inside the towers.  Although we see photographs of the victims of the 
attack and learn about their personal lives, rarely do we hear about the work that was done 
behind that curtain wall of concrete and tinted glass.   
 
The Trade Center (WTC) was above all a place of finance – not retail banking, of course, 
but a type of financial activity that involved trading.  If, before September 11
th, you were to 
choose,  between the restaurant at its pinnacle and the retail shops in its basement mall, a 
floor at random for exploration, you would more likely than not end up in a trading room, 
those vast open spaces where traders, salesmen, and analysts buy and sell stocks and bonds. 
Cantor Fitzgerald, for example, the bond-trading company that suffered most in the attack, 
was a trading room. Morgan Stanley, the largest tenant of the towers with 23 floors, had 
several trading rooms.   
 
In this paper we examine one such trading room and the experiences of its occupants by 
studying traders at a large investment bank located in the World Financial Center directly 
adjacent to the WTC.  The collapse of the twin towers destroyed their trading room, along 
with its computers, connections, facilities, and data.  The traders survived, but the attack 
forced them to relocate to a makeshift trading room in New Jersey.  The traders spent six 
long months exiled from the city. During that time, they confronted levels of anxiety and 
uncertainty they had never faced in their typically young lifetimes: an inescapable sense of 
vulnerability, the difficulties of trading securities outside Wall Street, and dramatic lines of 
fissure  in their organization. One year later, however, the bank had restored its trading 
technology, returned to its original Wall Street office, and all of the original traders that 
relocated to New Jersey had remained in the company. The case of pseudonymous 
International Securities thus provides a privileged entry point to understand organizational 
resilience.  In this paper we document the unfolding processes of organizational 
sensemaking that let the traders cope with extreme uncertainty and allowed the organization 
to survive.  
 
Confronting uncertainty, even extraordinary uncertainty, was not at all unusual for the 
traders at International Securities.  Prior to September 11
th, the bread and butter of 
International Securities was its demonstrable ability not simply to cope with but quite 
literally to thrive on volatility.  Finding profit opportunities in an informationally efficient   3 
market such as Wall Street required the bank to specialize in complex and ambiguous 
cases, generating innovative interpretations o f the economic environment.  We elaborate 
below how the trading room was organized to exploit market uncertainty.  Briefly here, a 
trading desk is like a well-trained submarine crew, with finely tuned instrumentation and 
intricate patterns of interaction t o execute complex maneuvers within rapidly changing 
markets.  Traders sit in front of Bloomberg screens with their colorful waterfalls of data.  
But, although the screens are flat, the informational world is rich and deep, and the actual 
experience is more like flying through the data than simply sitting in front of it.  The speed 
is tremendous.  At the extreme, the future is only two seconds away; and traders refer to 
price information that is fifteen minutes old as “historical data.”  To navigate successfully 
is to recognize patterns in the data, patterns remarkable for their complexity and elegance.  
The biggest challenge and the biggest money is to successfully explore uncharted territory 
– to re-cognize patterns in the terra incognita.   
 
The terrorist attack destroyed the pillars of this delicate organization, posing a fundamental 
threat to its continuity.  In the traders’ journey of exploration, September 11th was like a 
terrible shipwreck.  The story we tell here is less about the destruction of the vessel, for that 
is well-known (see for example Salgado 2002, Wrzesniewski  2002, Bartel 2002, Kendra 
and Wachtendorf 2003), than about the six-month long journey of recovery afterwards.  
The 160 traders at International Securities were a surviving crew.  The question was 
whether they could navigate their life rafts to safe harbor.  To do so, they would need to 
define themselves not simply as survivors but as sailors, sailors who could apply their 
collective seafaring skills to a primitive technology.  S ome familiar routines could be 
modified, but the crippled equipment would require restructuring of roles.  And the 
intensity of social life on the life raft would bring new uncertainties, new threats to the 
organization, and new challenges for leadership.  Would their chances be improved by 
letting the separate life rafts take different courses, or should the life rafts navigate in a 
coordinated manner so that the entire crew would arrive safely all together?      
  
We are fortunate that we can approach this question on the basis of close familiarity with 
International Securities.  Two years before September 11
th, we began ethnographic field 
research to study the social organization of trading.  We benefited from the bank’s 
generosity in providing us with a trader’s pass to the World Financial Center, a desk, a 
computer terminal, telephone extension, and most importantly the opportunity to interact 
with the traders and observe them directly at work. As a result of this rapport and trust, six 
days after the attack, amidst chaos and confusion, the traders invited us to continue our 
fieldwork in their makeshift trading room in New Jersey.  This is, to our knowledge, the 
only ethnographic study of an organization directly affected by September 11
th that 
benefited from the presence of the researchers at the firm prior to the attack.   
  
To understand how the traders at International Securities navigated the uncertainties of the 
post-September 11
th crisis,  we first sketch the organizational context of the trading room 
prior to the attack.  We summarize the organization of trading at the bank, its social 
character, and how it exploited financial uncertainty by developing multiple and rivalrous 
systems of interpreting markets.   After sketching our orienting framework about sense-
making in times of crisis, we go on to describe the devastating blow that September 11
th 
was for the firm, and follow the traders across the Hudson River in their escape from Wall   4 
Street to New Jersey.  We proceed by introducing the successive crises that flooded the 
lives of the traders: existential anxiety, questions of professional identity, uncertainty about 
the future of the firm, and ambiguities about the future location of the trading room. The 
trading room did not face one crisis – the immediate aftermath of  September 11
th – but 
many.  As we shall see, a given crisis was resolved by restoring identities; but identities, 
once restored, redefined the situation and lead to new crises.  That is, the successive waves 
of crisis were produced by each success in managing crisis.    
 
The trading room before September 11
th 
 
Pseudonymous International Securities is a global, non-American investment bank with 
128 offices in 26 countries across the US, Europe and Asia. Its American headquarters 
occupied some of the most prestigious real estate in New York -- the gleaming, irregular 
post-modern towers of the World  Financial  Center, located between the World Trade 
Center and the Hudson River in Lower Manhattan.  
 
One cannot understand the chaos that September 11th brought to International Securities 
without appreciating just how close the bank was located to the Trade Center. The World 
Trade and World Financial Center complexes could almost be thought of as one and the 
same thing: in their daily commutes to work, the traders at International Securities entered 
the lobby of the Trade Center, walked through the boutiques and coffee shops below the 
Twin Towers, crossed West Street through an elevated corridor and finally entered the 
Financial Center.  On rainy days, the traders stepped out of the subway and walked into 
their trading room without a drop of rain ever getting on their carefully-chosen business-
casual outfits.  
 
Our ethnographic study comprised sixty half-day visits conducted over the course of three 
years. During those 36 months, we undertook detailed observation at several trading desks, 
sitting in the tight space between traders, following trades as they unfolded and sharing 
lunch and jokes with the traders. We did this for three of the ten teams in the trading room. 
We complemented this data with in-depth interviews of traders in a more private setting, 
typically in a small conference room just off the trading room. Our research produced 
important findings on the strategy and organization of International Securities that help 
explain the events after September 11. 
 
The trading strategy of choice of quantitative traders at International Securities is arbitrage 
in its different blends and styles (for a detailed treatment of valuation and arbitrage, see 
Beunza and Stark 2004).  The arbitrageurs at International Securities represent a far cry 
from the traditional traders of Wall Street of the 1980s, aptly described by Tom Wolfe 
(1987) as Masters of the Universe.  Whereas the latter were characterized by their riches, 
bravado, and little regard for small investors, modern arbitrageurs have MBAs, degrees in 
finance, PhDs in physics and statistics, and are more appropriately thought of as engineers.
  
None of them wears suspenders. This change in the outlook and personality of traders is 
part of a silent technological revolution that swept over Wall Street in the last two decades.  
This revolution  – the quantitative revolution  in finance  – was ignited by the rise of 
derivatives such as futures and options, of mathematical formulas such as Black-Scholes, of   5 
network connectivity to electronic markets such as the NASDAQ, and by high-powered 
computers.   
Arbitrage is a creative trading strategy that hinges on the possibility of interpreting 
securities in multiple ways and produces profits by associating previously disparate 
markets. For example, arbitrageurs associate the markets for the stocks of two merging 
companies when the merger makes their value momentarily comparable. Or they associate 
the stocks of two companies that are in the same index, and hence move similarly; or a 
stock and a bond of the same company, whose value is linked by a legal clause that makes 
the bond convertible into stock. The point in every case is to avoid the conventional route 
of valuing a company by its intrinsic value or by how hot it is with market speculators, and 
to choose instead a lens that produces an opportunity –  a new, original valuation that 
differs from the value that the market assigns to a company. Thus, like a striking literary 
metaphor, an arbitrage trade reaches out and associates the value of a stock to some other, 
previously unidentified security. The two securities used for arbitrage have to be similar 
enough so as to hedge exposure, but different enough so that other traders have not seen the 
resemblance and realized the opportunity before. Each trade, then is never exactly like the 
previous one. While alternative trading strategies, such as value investing or momentum 
trading, emphasize early access to information, arbitrage draws on novel interpretation. 
Thus, whereas value trading is essentialist and momentum trading is extrinsic, arbitrage is 
associational (Beunza and Stark 2004). 
 
The trading room at International Securities was purpose-built to manage financial 
uncertainty. It was equipped (in its teams, its layout, its furnishings, and its technology) to 
meet the challenge of recognizing opportunities, and especially of making innovative 
associations. Each desk (e.g., merger arbitrage, index arbitrage, etc.) was organized around 
a distinctive evaluative principle and its corresponding cognitive frames, metrics, “optics,” 
and other specialized instrumentation for pattern recognition.  That is, the trading room was 
the site of diverse, indeed  rivalrous, principles of valuation.  And it was the interaction 
across this heterogeneity that generated innovation. The trading room was greater than the 
sum of the desks because co-location of diverse arbitrage strategies in the same room 
created a powerful synergy among them.  Traders acquired information from their 
Bloomberg screens; but the tacit knowledge to interpret this information and actually carry 
out their complex calculations for recognizing opportunities was acquired through 
spontaneous social interaction with proximate desks in the trading room (Beunza and Stark, 
2004).  For example, merger arbitrage traders would draw on the specialized knowledge of 
the nearby convertible bond traders or of those at the stock loan desk as they assessed 
features of a complex trade.  Frequently, as the traders explained, it was not simply 
requesting particular information but, instead, learning about what they did not even know 
they should know.
1  That is, judgments were often calibrated less by specifically directed 
questions than by unanticipated interactions and by communications that were overheard.   
 
                                                 
 
1 We think of this as a process of search where you don’t know what you’re looking for but 
will recognize it when you find it (see Beunza and Stark 2004).   
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The manager of the trading room promoted these crucial synergies by developing trust and 
risk-taking among traders through a set of human resource policies that put people first.  He 
replaced the subjective annual bonus, an infamous Wall Street tradition, with an objective 
bonus system to prevent traders from feeling personally undervalued when profits decrease 
for reasons beyond their control such as the economic cycle.   He made subtle change in the 
seating arrangements in the room so that traders would not always be sitting next to the 
same people but would get to know others.  Instead of in a closed office, the manager 
himself sat near the middle of the room, to reduce status differences and to promote the 
notion of open communication.  A wall-less, table-less corner of the room surrounded by 
whiteboard served as fast-turnover conference room where traders from different desks 
could exchange  their perspectives without risk of being trapped in an interminable, 
corporate-style meeting.  
 
Rather than bureaucratically hierarchical, the trading room was heterarchical (Stark 1999; 
Girard and Stark 2002).  In place of hierarchical, vertical ties, we found horizontal ties of 
lateral, distributed cognition; in place of a single metric of valuation, we found multiple 
metrics of value; and in place of designed and managed R&D, innovations were 
combinatorics (Kogut and Zander 1992) that emerged from the i nteraction across these 
coexisting principles and instruments. The trading room distributed intelligence and 
organized diversity.  The workplace culture that resulted from this highly localized 
proximity was a resource with which the traders not only faced but, in fact, profitably 
exploited the uncertainties that the market threw at them day by day, minute by minute.  
This heterarchical organizational form proved a resource to cope with the more difficult 
uncertainties created by the attack on the World Trade Center.    
 
Sense-making in crisis 
 
How do organizations cope with crisis?  In his book, Cognition in the Wild, Ed Hutchins 
(1995) presents a fascinating account of organizational behavior in a time of crisis.  While 
Hutchins was doing ethnographic research on a U.S. Navy vessel, the electrical power 
failed just as the large destroyer was entering the San Diego harbor.  The engines could be 
reversed but they would not take effect before the initial speed and the weight of the vessel 
would carry it on a calamitous course of collision with other ships anchored at bay.  The 
destroyer must be navigated to safety, yet all of its sophisticated navigational 
instrumentation had been rendered inoperative.  There was no time to issue orders down a 
chain of command.  Hutchins documents, in a literally second-by-second account, how the 
vessel was safely navigated in a process of self-organized, laterally coordinated, and 
socially distributed cognition. Uncertainty was confronted by a distributed decision-making 
– socially distributed both across people and artifacts.  
 
With Hutchins’ insights in mind, an observer would conclude that International Securities 
was particularly well prepared to withstand a shock.  With its socio-technical network of 
instrumentation and interacting desks, the trading room at International Securities relied 
extensively on distributed cognition to profit from market uncertainty on a daily basis.  The 
company had succeeded in a highly competitive industry through a heterarchical 
organizational structure with a flat hierarchy and competing subgroups that made sense of 
the environment in rivalrous ways (Girard and Stark, 2002).     7 
 
The experience of the World Financial Center traders after 9/11, however, differed in 
several fundamental ways from those of the San Diego sailors. Whereas the sailors 
navigated through a crisis and thereby narrowly avoided a catastrophe, the traders were 
working in crisis following a terrorist disaster. The combined effect of the 9/11 attack, 
terror, the anthrax deaths and subsequent fear, war, and displacement led to a cognitive 
shock that is well captured by Weick’s (1993) notion of “cosmological event” in which the 
universe no longer appears to make sense.  For instance, the destruction of the twin towers 
precipitated an ontological crisis in which the basic laws of matter that one has learned as a 
child now seem to be violated:  chairs can tip over, trees fall down, but buildings of that 
size and scale should not so quickly vanish.   
 
Unlike technological change, a financial crisis, or navigational failure at sea, a 
cosmological event is not fully captured by the notion of uncertainty, even in its extreme 
form.  The remedies to it are accordingly different. The pressing questions about safety, 
career, and well-being that characterized the environment on the wake of September 11
th 
did not need to be brought into the trading room in New Jersey – they were all too present, 
in the form of mourning for deceased friends, repeated images of a disaster site that was 
their former  workplace, and worrying news of anthrax from the CNN monitors.  If 
anything, the traders needed some isolation, at least emotionally, from these concerns.  
 
The social-psychological contours of the September 11
th crisis called, instead, for limiting 
the organization’s exposure to environmental uncertainty, and promoting within it the 
conditions that would enable the firm overcome the crisis. For example, in a discussion of 
leadership, Weick (1995) retells an extraordinary story about a military unit in crisis that 
survived thanks to the unwarranted resolve produced by a map that did not correspond to 
the actual territory they faced: 
 
The incident happened during military maneuvers in Switzerland. The young 
lieutenant of a small Hungarian detachment in the Alps sent a reconnaissance 
unit into the icy wilderness. It began to snow immediately, snowed for two 
days, and the unit did not return. The lieutenant suffered, fearing that he had 
dispatched his own people to death. But on the third day the unit came back. 
Where had they been? How had they made their way? Yes, they said, we 
considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. And then one of us found a 
map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the 
snowstorm, and then with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we 
are. The lieutenant borrowed this remarkable map and had a good look at it. 
He discovered to his astonishment that it was not the map of the Alps, but the 
map of the Pyrenees (Weick 1995: 54). 
 
The false map, then, saved the organization by preventing paralysis in the face of dissent, 
fear and doubt.  Weick ends this account about sensemaking by referring to one business 
leader’s comment on it: “That story would have been even better if the leader of the troops 
had known that it was the wrong map and still been able to lead them back.” Weick regards 
this comment as very interesting, since it describes a situation that many leaders often face: 
followers are lost and even the leader is not sure where to go.    8 
   
We find the Hungarian soldiers’ story apt both for thinking about the problems at 
International Securities in particular and more generally about leadership in non-
hierarchical organizations. Heterarchies are predicated on the belief that superiors do not 
have more or b etter information than other members of the organization. Indeed, in 
heterarchies, solutions typically emerge from interactions within the organization instead of 
from its top. Knowledge does not merely flow up and down along the lines of command, 
but laterally across social networks. This view of organizations raises an important question 
about the actor formally charged with responsibility for the company: if leadership is not 
about being the repository of knowledge or information hub of the organization, what does 
it mean to lead in a heterarchy? 
 




th, 2001, the work of the arbitrageurs at International Securities was 
interrupted by a sudden explosion in the building adjacent to it, the World Trade Center.  
As they rushed to the windows of their trading room, the traders saw Tower 1 of the Trade 
Center go up in flames.  From that vantage point, some saw the frightful approach of the 
second plane.  That crash brought terror to the trading room, and a tumultuous escape to the 
Hudson River.  By the time the towers fell, many of the traders were on boats to New 
Jersey. Fortunately, none of them was harmed.  
 
As with the rest of New Yorkers, the attack threw the traders into a state of unprecedented 
confusion and equivocality.  Is this real? Is it a nightmare?  Consider, for example, the case 
of Ray, senior trader at the customer sales desk.  He was the first one to escape from the 
trading room on September 11th.  He left the building as soon as the first plane hit, took the 
ferry, and drove home to New Jersey, where on his living room television he watched the 
towers collapse.  Even to someone like Ray who was at the WFC at the time of the attack, 
the collapse of the towers on TV had a sense of unreality.  He recalls, 
 
Watching [the towers fall], it was very easy to be in denial. You are looking 
at the tower and wondering, how did they manage to make this movie look 
so real?  
 
The unreality of the TV images stemmed from their abrupt departure from the traders’ 
established mental schemata.  The images forced the trader to radically update his belief 
system: the Twin Towers were no longer there, Lower Manhattan was fractured at its core,  
America suddenly was a vulnerable place.  What did all that mean?   
 
Like Ray, the rest of the traders at the bank desperately needed to make sense of events.  
This process rapidly took on a social nature.  On the night of September 11
th, the manager 
of the trading room met with other senior traders and technical staff to discuss the 
disastrous situation of the bank.  The Trade Center had collapsed at its doorstep.  The 
building was badly damaged. As a result, the lively trading room that had once supported 
the innovative work of arbitrage became a dark hole with no electricity, no connectivity and 
no assurance of safety from toxic chemicals.  The bank did have another available facility, 
a back-office in pseudonymous Escapaway, a small suburban town in New Jersey. But the   9 
only resource that the traders could count on in that place was spare space in a basement 
where the firm stored corporate-style minicomputers for processing payroll data. That 
basement had no workstations, no desks, and no connectivity.  Nevertheless, the manager 
and the others decided to do whatever possible to continue International Securities’ 
operations in equity arbitrage.  They estimated that it would take them from three weeks to 
three months to begin trading again.  
 
Like the group of traders who met with the manager, the rest of the employees in the 
trading room also needed to rein in their ambiguities.  Unlike the trading room managers 
and the technical staff, they did not have the chance to meet face-to-face and decide on the 
trading room’s future.  They resorted to phoning each other.  As Ray says,   
 
The first two days it was talking to the people I’m most close to. We did not 
know what the hell was gonna happen. We didn’t even know that place [the 
warehouse in Escapaway] existed.  I was phoning from home. Getting ahold 
of everybody, making sure they were OK. The next three days, talking to 
others less close. 
 
Some employees, especially those who did not have the home phone number of others, 
began to interact through the Internet. That interaction was facilitated by the bank when it 
created, in those first days after the attack, a web site of “accounted-for” traders. On the 
site, traders could post that they had survived and could also indicate that they had been in 
contact with others who had managed to get home unharmed.  Once the site was up, 
however, they began to use it as a means for sensemaking: sharing their puzzlement, asking 
questions to each other, etc.  The accounted-for web site, according to an executive, had 
postings such as: 
 
‘No one has called me.’ 
‘I don’t know if I still have a job.’ 
‘Can someone tell me what’s going on?’ 
 
Hence, the traders’ bricolage had turned an official list of survivors into a chat-room of 
sorts. But this interactivity posed a problem:  the medium gave every employee a view to 
everyone else’s confusion.  Instead of structuring the ways in which the employees made 
meaning of the tragedy in a way that gave reassurance, the web site was promoting anxiety.  
Greg, an executive at the bank, was sensitive to the problem. Although only a matter of 
days, the bank’s delay in answering those postings, he felt, was “eternal.” Out of his own 
initiative, he posted a note saying, “We are trying to re-establish the systems and contact 
you.” The point, he explained, was to send a deeper message to the employees: 
 
It was basically so that they would see that someone was looking at this 
website and that someone cared.  The message really was “be patient. You 
are valued employees.” 
 
Beyond the confines of International Securities, a symbolic attack called for a symbolic 
response. On September 14
th, the chairman of the New York Stock Exchange vowed to re-
open the stock market on September 17th to move the United States towards normality.    10 
Underscoring the dramaturgical character of the early market opening, the Exchange and 
the NASDAQ undertook a full-scale test of their communications, computers and power 
systems three days before re-opening  -- the financial equivalent of a dress rehearsal in 
theater.  Emphasizing the message of the markets, President Bush tied the reopening of the 
market to the country’s recovery, declaring that “the markets open tomorrow, people go 
back to work, and we'll show the world.”
 Vice-President Cheney went further, urging 
investors to buy and demonstrate “confidence in the country, confidence in our economy.”2  
Selling was deemed unpatriotic.  The neutral, impartial activity of capturing bits of 
financial value through arbitrage suddenly became laden with ethical and national value.  
 
The management at International Securities also understood the importance of a symbolic 
response.  It decided to reopen as soon as the markets did, not only for the sake of its 
customers but in particular to reassure its employees.  Despite the lack of f acilities, 
computers, and connections, and even though they estimated it would take them at least 
three weeks to trade again, barely six days after September 11
th -- by the time the New 
York Stock Exchange re-opened on September 17
th -- the traders at International Securities 
were trading again. We were privileged to witness how this was accomplished.  Days after 
the attack, we sent an email to the bank to ask if everyone had escaped unharmed.  To our 
relief, we learned that no one was injured. To our surprise, the return email included an 
invitation, indeed, an insistence, that we come over to New Jersey to witness the recovery 
process. “It is chaotic,” wrote the manager of the trading room, “but also very inspiring.” 
Our presence would be “a reminder of normal times.”  As ethnographers, we felt 
enormously honored to be welcomed to document these extraordinary efforts. 
 
Managing Fear: High-touch, low-tech 
 
Thus, two days after market re-opening, we were back among the traders in our new role of 
conspicuous observers, this time in an improvised trading room in a converted warehouse 
in Escapaway, New Jersey. The trading room was located in the basement of the building.  
To reach it, we had to cross through several rows of corporate cubicles and interminable 
corridors of beige carpet.  And after the cubicles, a truly unexpected sight -- the trading 
room.  A cavernous open-plan space, complete with traders, desks, computers, outsized TV 
screens, and multi-time zone clocks. The room had a makeshift feel to it: no windows, a 
low ceiling and walls painted in industrial yellow, more fitting for a storage than for a 
trading room.   Correspondingly, the dress code had shifted from business casual to jeans 
and boots.  The room was noisy, but the sound, as one trader put it, was “a wonderful sound 
of life.”   
 
Prominent, indeed, omnipresent in the room were American flags.  A huge American flag 
hung in the middle of one wall, and small flags were on nearly every traders’ desk or 
attached to monitors.  In these first days after the attack, to the question, “Who am I?”  the 
                                                 
2 The President’s and Vice President’s remarks were quoted in Richard Stevenson and 
Jonathan Fuerbringer. “Nation Shifts Its Focus to Wall Street as a Major Test of Attack's 
Aftermaths,” New York Times, Sept 17, 2001.  
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answer was “an American.”  The task of re-opening the securities exchanges in which the 
traders were participating was cast as an act of patriotism.   
 
What was happening in those first days?  Traders were dealing with their own fear and grief 
in a situation in which their colleagues were also afraid and grieving. As one executive of a 
World Trade Center firm told us:  
 
This was not a fire in a building which just destroyed 2 floors... Most 
everybody lost people they knew. They were traumatized, there was fear of 
war. Nobody knew if the next day there was going to be more. I had a guy 
walking around with a picture of his wife and kids in his pocket and was 
looking at it every two minutes because he was afraid he was never going to 
get home again (quoted in Kelly and Stark 2002). 
 
The tragedy had affected the traders’ mood, creating an understandable increase in their 
anxiety level.  “I’m so stressed I almost stop by a drugstore and buy all the pills there,” said 
one trader at International Securities.  Cell phones, the tiniest ones imaginable and many 
purchased after September 11,
th were not placed at arm’s reach on desks but were kept in 
pockets or attached to belts so that in another evacuation this lifeline to family could not be 
forgotten. That such an evacuation in New Jersey was improbable would miss the point that 
the traders were anxious enough to take the precautions.    
 
Bob, the trading room manager, understood the threat that the traders’ uncertainties posed 
to the organization if they went unattended.
3  “Everything ok?” he asked, stopping by each 
trader’s desks on regular rounds of walking through the trading room.  At some point, he 
came close to the desk that we were observing. “Everything fine,” went the unanimous 
answer.  But as he stayed two more minutes making small-talk, one of the traders took him 
aside, and said:  
 
Actually, Bob, I wanted to ask you something. I’m buying a house, and the 
closing is in three weeks. I did it with the previous trading room in mind, but 
now I don’t know where we’ll be.  
 
The manager then spent some additional time chatting with the trader, aware that what 
seems like a question is also a request for more conversation. 
 
By walking the room, Bob was gaining an appreciation from the traders of the different 
issues that affected their lives and the continuity of the organization.  Before September 
11,
th he used to walk the room for the purpose of “risk management,” that is, identifying 
sources of market uncertainty unforeseen by mathematical risk models.  Now he did so to 
gain a grip on the personal uncertainty of the traders.    
 
                                                 
3 Barsade (2002), for example, refers to emotional contagion, the “transfer of mood among 
people in a group, and subsequent effect on group dynamics.”    
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As we moved to the statistical arbitrage desk, we found Todd assuring his administrative 
assistant –a middle-aged woman of Asian origin with moderate command of English – that 
the risks of small pox were low, and detailing to her the difference between small pox and 
chicken pox.  A few feet away from them, Stan, a customer-sales trader, was talking to a 
client on the phone, apparently explaining to him how to adapt his financial strategy to the 
new political context… but ultimately just giving reassurance: 
 
I just don’t see this market going anywhere, and with any scare story, it 
might do something... Are you nervous about it? Don’t be nervous, man. 
I’ve got you covered. 
 
However, as soon as Stan retreated from his front-stage role, he showed us a very different 
face.  “We’re nutty since the attack,” he confessed. “Whenever I go home and drive near 
Newark airport and see the planes fly so low...”  One level up the command chain Stan’s 
boss, Ray, took up the task of reassuring Stan.  After hearing Stan discuss the probabilities 
of a real biological threat, Ray replied, “I don’t think they have the technology to do that.” 
“If you say so...” Stan conceded, but then, unpersuaded, added, “but they had the 
technology to do something much worse!”   Ray later told us that he saw his role as 
“reassuring people.”  Meanwhile, Ray’s boss, the manager of the trading room, put on the 
same facade of reassurance towards the rest of the employees in the form of general 
assembly-like speeches. Thus, junior traders appeared calm and assured to clients, but 
disclosed their fears to their senior counterparts.  Senior traders, in turn, reassured junior 
traders and administrative assistants, despite being privately skeptical about the future.  
And, in turn, the manager reassured the whole trading room and showed no cracks in public 
(though he voiced them to us in private).  In this circumstance, “what made the difference,” 
as one manager noted, “for every company that came back successfully [was] that kind of 
touch, high-touch, low-tech solution” (quoted in Kelly and Stark 2002; and, for another 
case history, see Freeman, Hirschhorn, and Maltz 2002).  
  
Identities in practice 
 
After the attack, the traders were left wondering whether their firm would continue to exist, 
whether the trading room would operate again, what they should do, and even what they 
were.  The basement turned those survivors back into traders.  The layout of the room had 
been creatively inscribed to restore meaning and order to the traders. The traders were in 
New Jersey, unquestionably in a basement storage room in New Jersey.  But a sign taped 
prominently on the wall gave different bearings: “20
th Floor, Equities.” In other corners of 
the same enormous room one could read: “21
st Floor, Fixed Income” and “19
th Floor, Risk 
Management.” Our traders were still between the 19
th and the 21
st floors, but now 
horizontally rather than vertically. Moreover, within the constraints of those temporary 
quarters, they had arranged their desks to reproduce the layout of the Financial Center 
trading room. For example, every trader in the “agency trading” desk remained together, 
sitting on the same desk. In New Jersey, they camped on a table partly occupied by two 
photocopiers and three fax machines, in what used to be the fax station of the data center. 
They camped, but they stayed together. 
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To the question o f, “who am I?” the computers, desks, and open-plan space answered “a 
trader.”  The “20
th Floor” sign not only reminded traders that the equities trading room was 
located between risk management and fixed income, but also led employees back to their 
jobs as traders.  To the question of, “what should I do?” the “20
th floor” sign answered: the 
same as you would in the Financial Center trading room. 
The Escapaway trading room offers a striking contrast to a crisis analyzed by Karl Weick.  
That case involved the Mann Gulch disaster in which 15 firefighters perished.  As part of a 
more general argument about how identity is vital for sensemaking, Weick carefully 
reconstructs how the firefighters became disoriented.   
 
The critical threat to the firefighters’ role identities came when the leader 
told the retreating crew “throw away your tools!” A fire crew that retreats 
from a fire should find its identity and morale strained. If the retreating 
people are then also told to discard the very things that are their reason for 
being there in the first place, then the moment quickly turns existential. If I 
am no longer a firefighter, then who am I? With the fire bearing down, the 
only possible answer becomes, An endangered person in a world where it is 
every man for himself. (Weick, 1993: 637) 
 
In the trading room, by contrast, the traders were told, in effect, “pick up your tools” – 
begin the process of sensemaking and orienting yourself in the world by affirming your 
identity as a trader through the act of trading.
4      
 
If the traders would confirm their identities through the actual practice of trading, the 
rudimentary technologies and limited bandwidth of the makeshift trading room meant that 
it would require considerable improvisation.  In the face of damaged technologies and 
missing tools, the traders actively recombined old and new tools to be able to trade again. 
In the agency trading desk, for example, junior traders manually performed operations that 
were previously automated by the trading engine such as booking trades, registering them, 
breaking them up, etc., effectively taking the bank to the trading technology that it had five 
years before.  Lacking seats, they stood up behind the lucky senior traders who had a seat 
and a computer, ready to help. When, in the middle of a phone conversation, one such 
trader suddenly needed to record a transaction, at the shout of “gimme a ticket, somebody 
gimme a ticket!” three junior traders scrambled to offer tickets, paper and whatever he 
might need.  Another junior was sent to “help with the tickets” and “relieve others” in a 
different desk.  But he was told that with a sensitivity to the situation characteristic of 
International Securities: following the indications, the senior trader who gave them added 
“Oh, and this isn’t permanent, by the way.” So unusual was manual bookkeeping for the 
                                                 
4 Identities are made through social interaction: “The characteristic features of the actor 
arise in the interaction with the context and, in that sense, the actor is made, just as he helps 
to make the other actors in the network.  … Identities (the reproduction of actors) thus 
cannot be taken for granted.  If the conditions are not met, identities will not be sustained”  
(White, 1995:81).  In addition to interactions with other people, the social character of 
identities is also socio-technical (Callon 1998:15) including interacting with things.  That 
is, among the “conditions to be met” are the tools with which people can enact their 
identities.     14 
junior traders – so radical the bricolage that it entailed – that some of them did not even 
know how to do it, or whether it was appropriate for them to do it. 
 
What is the lesson from the makeshift trading room for the organization of responsiveness? 
Responsiveness, the experience of these traders suggests, is a combination of anticipation 
and improvisation (Tierney 2002;  Beunza and Stark 2003; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003; 
Perrow 2002).  The bank had a space, but it was far from a perfect replica of the trading 
room at the Financial Center.  Yet, the traders managed to be trading in it from day one.  
How?  By engaging in bricolage. The bank had a warehouse, with square feet and little 
else.  In that square footage the traders saw a resource – and used it to arrange the desks in 
almost the same configuration as in their former trading room. The tools the traders had at 
their disposal were rudimentary in comparison with the precision instruments they were 
accustomed to.  In New Jersey they had only single-line phones, home laptops, reduced 
connectivity, and single-screen terminals. But they made them work: they managed to talk 
to other banks, enter orders, and connect to the market. Like good bricoleurs, the traders did 
not let imperfection stand in the way of accomplishing tasks.  Instead of waiting for the 
trading engine to be restored or for new servers to be delivered, the traders readily 
recombined old and new technologies. They matched their do-it-yourself outfits – jeans and 
boots – with a corresponding willingness to solve problems. In this process, some traders 
became clerks, others manual operators, and others became roommates of bandwidth, 
sharing cable to the NYSE.  These changes in role status did not detract from their status as 
traders; in fact, it is how they reaffirmed their status as traders.  Sometimes things have to 
change to remain the same. Their identities as traders was inscribed on their business cards.  
But what do traders do?  They trade.  By repositioning themselves in the damaged socio-
technical networks, the traders found ways to trade.  Innovation is not having new resources 
to accomplish new tasks but recognizing configurations that others would not see as 
resources.  Responsiveness is grounded in this resourceful recognition (Beunza and Stark 
2003). 
 
In contrast to the Mann-Gulch firefighters, the traders at International Securities were told 
to “pick up your tools.”  Weick is correct.  But to his insight we add another:  success in 
restoring an identity  can lead to new crises.  Restoring the trading capability of the 
organization did not put an end to its problems.  The repercussions of September 11th were 
far more complex than a single crisis of identity.  As we shall see below, the very fact of 
buying and selling securities affirmed the employees’ identities as traders, but eventually 




Whereas trading resolved fundamental uncertainties by restoring basic identities, the 
particular circumstances of the Fall of 2001 brought new uncertainties directly into the very 
practice of trading.  On October 7th, the anticipated war broke out between the US and 
Afghanistan.  “Investors,” The New York Times wrote on the following day, “will enter 
unfamiliar territory as stock markets in the United States and around the world open this 
morning for trading.” Unfamiliar indeed: traders who had transformed financial uncertainty 
into probabilities and scenarios, facts and figures, now had to introduce the political logic 
of war-related news into their economic calculations.  Even worse, those political   15 
developments were not unrelated to their own personal security but now threatened them 
directly. The emotional detachment that had served traders so effectively during peace-time 
was now much more difficult to recreate.    
 
Because the war affected stock prices, traders at International Securities had to dissect 
incoming news from the war.  Despite being arbitrageurs, in principle unconcerned by 
market direction, they could easily “get hooked” from a sudden fall in the market – that is, 
be unable to find a counterpart for a trade in a sharply falling market, and thus be stuck in 
the middle of a trade, resulting in precisely the sort of dangerous exposure to the ups-and-
downs in the price of a stock that arbitrageurs try to avoid.  War also affected them in other 
ways: in the statistical arbitrage desk, for example, Todd found that the conflict had altered 
the historical correlations of some stocks.  For example, the price of Boeing and Northrop 
Grumman had traditionally moved in parallel, as the market valued both as “aviation 
stocks.”  But with the rise of political uncertainty, the value of military stocks went up, 
while the value of tourist-travel related stocks decreased.  
 
As market-driving events shifted from economic to political ones the traders had to develop 
new mental frameworks to interpret developments. At the customer sales desk, for 
example, traders quickly learned that the market had knee-jerk negative reactions to news 
of American casualties from the war as well as to news of accidents anywhere in the world, 
even before these could be confirmed as  terrorists acts.    For example, consider the 
following discussion between Josh, senior trader at the customer trading desk, and Stan, a 
more junior one, about how to avoid being hooked (unable to complete an arbitrage hedge).  
Josh recommended trading following the advances of the American army: 
 
— You have to wait until they give more war news, something good like 
they took another airport. You should short everything until the rangers get 
to Afghanistan. 
— Is that good news? 
— I guess... 
 
The traders modified their information channels to complement the switch to politics.  The 
television screens in the trading room, normally tuned to the financial news channel CNBC, 
were tuned to CNN.  And in their spare time, and without pausing for explicit direction 
from management, the traders discussed the war.  According to Bob, the manager, 
 
This is an information-assessment room, and what they do is what they have 
always been doing all the time, incorporating all the information they 
receive. The problem is that  now they do it with news of political 
uncertainty, and so, for example, do you know of daisy cutters? No? Well, 
let me tell you, they are the latest bomb. We’re learning everything about 
that, and I can tell you all you want to know. We had been focused on 
Anthrax, then moved on to small pox, then strategies for war in 
Afghanistan... the whole thing. People compare notes, talk to each other.  
 
Adaptation to wartime trading was not costless.   The traders were in a difficult bind.  To 
trade, they needed to be monitoring political developments minute by minute; but the more   16 
closely they followed the news about anthrax, biological weapons, war, and terrorism, the 
more they dwelled on matters of their own and their families’ insecurity.   They had 
narrowly escaped the immediate tragedy of the September 11
th attack, but they could not 
escape the consequences of its aftermath. Trading, which had offered a momentary reprieve 
from the original trauma, was now a source of new anxieties.  While the economic 
uncertainty that traders characteristically transformed into risk could be boiled down to 
depersonalized numbers and dealt with in a detached manner, the continuous 
transformation of political news into risk ended up having unintended effects  – it 
exaggerated the traders’ fears.  As a consequence, the atmosphere in the trading room, Bob 
said, became “very depressing.”  
 
Technology also had an effect in this process.  In the former room at the 
Financial Center, traders could choose whether or not to listen to the news, 
thanks to small individual speakers at every trader’s desk.  Indeed, most of 
the time, many chose not to.  In the trading room at Escapaway, however, 
there was only one large speaker, always turned on.  Although obviously not 
as trapped in the war as American soldiers on Afghan soil, from a cognitive 
standpoint, the traders in that Escapaway trading room were also trapped in 
the war.   
Wall Street traders … in New Jersey 
 
As the initial burst of patriotic fervor and the exhilaration of meeting the challenges 
of rebuilding gave way to the realities of long commutes and continued anxieties, 
Escapaway became increasingly burdensome for the traders.  The temporary trading 
room was barely an hour’s drive from Manhattan, but it felt a universe away from 
the excitement and activity of Wall Street.  Located in a suburban corporate park, 
the building was surrounded by similar low-rise corporate offices of manufacturing 
companies such as Colgate or AT&T.  Just around the corner, a farm announced 
“Hay For Sale,” and the surroundings offered an endless succession of 
indistinguishable shopping malls. The remote back office of International Securities 
had, in effect, become its front office too. The traders, in short, were Wall Street 
traders in New Jersey.   
 
International Securities’ move to an all-inclusive trading room in Escapaway had confirmed 
their identities as traders, but their occupational identities were not confined to such a 
simple construct.  Over time, the circumstances in New Jersey began to threaten their 
identities as sophisticated Manhattanite professionals.  As affluent Wall Streeters, the 
traders were recipients of the glamour and cachet bestowed upon them by countless 
artifacts of modern global culture, from Oliver Stone’s Wall Street to Tom Wolfe’s Bonfire 
of Vanities. But once you strip trading of the landmark skyscrapers, the amenities of the 
financial district and the fat bonuses, what does buying and selling stocks for a living 
mean? Indeed, to judge from the traders’ appearance – from their improvised jeans-and-
boots dress code, the cramped facilities and outmoded computers – they suddenly looked 
more like the working-class, rent-a-seat day traders that one of us studied during the early 
months of the NASDAQ boom (Beunza 1999).  September 1 1
th had given a blue-collar 
appearance to a work environment that used to be highly refined even among the affluent 
white-collar professionals.    17 
 
The grim suburban reality of Escapaway had no amenities for the traders to escape the 
pressure of their trading room.  According to one trader, 
 
Being in Escapaway was horrible. You were stuck. What could you do? You 
could drive to Wal-Mart, you could drive to Home Depot. One thing about 
Escapaway is, people who never lived in the suburbs were able to test it out 
(...) Being there taught more than one that they did not want to live there. 
 
The traders’ new hometown quickly became a lightning rod for jokes.  During one of our 
visits, an excited junior trader announced to the rest of the desk that he had managed to 
download from the web the streets of Escapaway so that “you can find all the fast-food 
restaurants.”  To this, a senior trader replied in jest,  
 
Why do you need a map for that? There’s so many Dunkin Donuts here, 
someone told me once to turn right on the Dunkin Donut and I turned on the 
wrong one.  
 
Another trader described being in Escapaway as follows: 
 
It was like... like, you know, when you go to Mexico, they say the locals can 
drink the water and not get sick. Well, the people in Escapaway can eat from 
McDonald’s everyday and not get sick. 
 
The firm had put in place a makeshift cafeteria service but, like college cafeterias during 
periods of exams, the food took up more than its share of blame for the anxiety of the 
customers.    According to one executive, 
 
In the trading room of the Financial Center we had sushi Tuesdays and 
Thursdays. The food was pretty decent down there, steak, all that jazz. Now 
we’re eating junk. Deli food. There’s enough for everyone. But because it’s a 
buffet line, people unconsciously think there’s gonna be shortage, so they eat 
more.  People smoke a lot more, and some went back to smoking. So people 
either ate more, drank more, or smoked more.  
 
The problem, of course, was not the food.  Escapaway, as another trader put it, was “not 
consistent” with his choice of occupation.  His most acute memory of those months was 
having to use backup chemical toilets, something “unheard of for someone working in the 
securities industry.”   
 
As we saw, traders frequently used humor, sometimes self-deprecating, sometimes cynical, 
to create psychological distance from Escapaway.   But there were other ways of expressing 
their lack of identification with the locale.  In one of the very frequent conversations about 
the commute, a trader commented,  
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Traffic moves now twenty miles an hour faster than before all this 
happened. If everyone is doing eighty five, I’m doing ninety five. I’ve got 
a sports car. 
 
This trader effectively ended up defying the law – traffic regulations, in this case – for  
reasons not unlike those of teenagers whether urban or suburban: to manifest his identity by 
stating that he was different from the locals, and that their rules did not apply to him.  
 
As frustration mounted, some traders began to contemplate alternative jobs at rival banks in 
the city.  “At least two I know were really ready to throw in the towel,” a senior trader 
recalled.  To the many questions that traders were asking themselves, now there was one 
more to add: do I want to work here? Ray, senior trader at the merger arbitrage desk, 
addressed those who were considering switching jobs as follows:  
 
I told them, “now is not the time. Everything’s changed so much, it’s not 
time to change anything else. The job is at least something you can hold on 
to.”  
 
A Threat to the Firm: the break-up of the trading room 
 
On December 2001, the bank’s steady path to recovery suffered a sudden blow: a group of 
traders decided to leave the premises at Escapaway and establish themselves in a temporary 
trading room in Midtown Manhattan.    The heads of the merger, options, and convertible 
bond arbitrage desks, responsible for 24 traders in total, rented office space in Midtown and 
began to trade from there.  They were not changing jobs, but they were changing locales.   
The bank accepted their re-location.   But it was widely felt that the move could jeopardize 
the unity of the trading room and ultimately the existence of the firm.   
 
Bob, the trading room manager, explained the move as a solution to acute differences in 
preferences among traders about the desirable location for the trading room.  The traders 
who lived in Manhattan did not want to work in New Jersey, as they did not want to be 
outside the city in case of an attack while their families remained there. On the other hand, 
the traders who lived and had their families outside Manhattan did not want to risk their 
lives by going to work in Manhattan.  “Manhattan traders,” the manager explained, 
justifying his decision to give the departing traders green light to go, “didn’t ever sign up 
for a job in New Jersey.  Some of the people [who chose to go] are really crucial,” 
[emphasis in the original] and thus the bank had to accept their conditions.    
 
The departing traders, however, justified their move in a different way.  They emphasized 
the networking and informational advantages of Midtown Manhattan.5  According to Max 
Sharper, head of the merger arbitrage desk, “the difference between Midtown and 
                                                 
 
5 Beunza and Stark (2003) discuss the changing urban geography of finance in the context 
of debates about the future of Lower Manhattan.  For overviews on the geography of 
finance, see papers in Corbridge and Thrift 1994; Leyshoon and Thrift 1997; Martin 1999; 
and Clark et al 2000.   19 
Escapaway is like between being in the solar system or outside.”  M erger arbitrage, as 
noted above, consists on valuing firms based on the price of their merger partners.  When 
two firms announce a merger, Max added, “we typically want to know their commitment” 
to the merger.  Midtown Manhattan was particularly good for t his purpose because 
companies announce mergers in presentations in Midtown hotels.  Being close to them 
enabled traders to attend those presentations, and doing so in person gave arbitrageurs an 
advantage in relation to listening to them web cast over the Internet.  “Perhaps,” Max said, 
“there is something that you miss in the digital transmission; perhaps they show charts and 
graphs that are not on the web site.”   Furthermore, webcasts of the analyst meetings “do 
not capture the reactions of the people in the room or in the corridors after the meeting.”  
Midtown gave traders yet another advantage, improved networking possibilities with 
members of the arbitrage community.  In this sense, Max observed, 
 
Being in Midtown allows you to have the occasional lunch, or the drink after 
work. We are five people on the desk, and each week I’d say we do one or 
two lunches and one or two research meetings. This increases if there are 
earnings announcements.   
 
The departing traders, thus, appeared to place greater importance on the external networks 
and communities of practice than on their intra-organizational ties.     
 
Despite the many advantages of the Midtown trading room for the departing traders, it had 
strong negative political and structural repercussions on the rest of the organization.  For 
the traders who remained in Escapaway, the move felt like special treatment for a few, an 
unusual practice in a bank that minimized status differences.  One of them noted that it 
“might have created jealousy even if, for some, being there [in Escapaway] was not more 
desirable.”  
 
The new trading room revealed the extent to which the firm based its knowledge-sharing on 
co-location of the traders.  The desks that left the main trading room for the Midtown 
trading room included the merger arbitrage, options arbitrage and convertible bond 
arbitrage.  These possess crucial information about the details of mergers and the volatility 
of stocks.  Their departure cut off the rest of the desks at Escapaway – the customer sales 
desk, the long-short desk, and the stock loan, index arbitrage, and statistical arbitrage desks 
– from the vital circulation of knowledge.  Commenting on the move, a senior trader who 
remained at Escapaway noted, 
 
Before, it was like, they’re the audience, we’re the show, or the other way 
around, we’re the audience, they’re the show. But the truth is, they have the  
information we need. 
 
The Midtown trading room thus began to threaten the continuity of the bank itself.  The 
manager shared with us his concern about this issue in one of those moments when 
ethnographers become privy to worries that the confidant does not share with his or her 
colleagues.  “Would you mind closing the door?” he asked, in the middle of one of our 
conversations. (By December 2001, our meetings with the manager were no longer taking   20 
place in the open trading floor but in a windowless conference room.)  Exhausted, peering 
up to the ceiling and speaking in hushed tones, Bob continued: 
 
In the past, what kept us all in International Securities was that the Financial 
Center was a very good compromise for everybody – for those of us who 
lived in Manhattan as well as those who lived in New Jersey.  
   
With the destruction of the Financial Center, Bob added, that truce was unsealed.  The 
move of the traders to Midtown, Bob said, “introduces personal economic uncertainty... for 
me too.”  Suppose, he said, that the departing desks do well in their new location.  This, he 
thought, could mean the end of the trading room, for, 
 
If it becomes clear that we can trade separately, you wonder what’s keeping 
us together, what’s preventing some of us from starting an independent 
hedge fund.  
 
Thus the manager, along with his traders, faced a new question: what, after all, was the 
point of having all the desks together?  What exactly were the synergies that made the 
trading room more than the sum of its desks? Before the attack, nobody questioned the 
advantages of being together, and no-one considered leaving the bank.  By December 2001, 
however, not even the integrity of the firm was taken for granted.   
 
Enacting back to business-as-usual 
 
Like the Hungarian detachment discussed by Weick, the trading room at International 
Securities was also an organization in crisis, and one in which its leadership was similarly 
in the dark.  What they could do was to display confidence that the organization would hold 
together.  In their case, too, they had a kind of map – one that pointed to the return to the 
World Financial Center. The defection of the traders to Midtown could be presented as 
“temporary” because the arrows from Escapaway and from Midtown both pointed to the 
former trading room. 
 
Aware of the need to reduce uncertainty, management presented the Midtown trading room 
as a short-term policy.  Officially, the firm was committed to return to the building it left, 
the World Financial Center, as soon as it re-opened.  But the manager lacked crucial 
knowledge about the possibilities for returning.  When we privately asked him for a 
tentative return date, Bob laid his doubts open, 
 
We don’t know when it’s going to open up, and indeed, whether it’s going to 
open up at all. Well, of course time is the issue here because it will likely 
open up at some point. But it may not be relevant for us, because people 
don’t want to stay here, and the longer we stay the worse the danger of 
attrition.  
 
The manager, in other words, did not know.  But in every interaction that we observed or 
heard about he conveyed the confident posture – “We will return.”  His commitment to 
returning to the Financial Center – a commitment to a future that resembled the past of the   21 
firm – was part of his broader program of publicly interpreting the situation as on cruise to 
normality in the hope of bringing about that very outcome: Bob the manager was enacting 
back-to-business (Weick 1979).  
This strategy faced two difficulties. First, as Bob’s remarks indicated, there was a real 
possibility that the trading room in the World Financial Center would not be re-opened.   
What if the “bathtub,” the infrastructure that supported the building against the Hudson 
River, was found to be structurally compromised?  What if a mysterious mold was found, 
as happened in the Bankers’ Trust building also adjacent to the Trade Center?  What if the 
dust absorbed by the air conditioning system, at first declared to be harmless, later turned 
out to be carcinogenic? 
 
Second, as Bob’s remarks also indicated, the strategy faced a ticking clock.   International 
Securities’ fiscal year ended March 31
st and with that the determination of bonuses.  As the 
executive in charge of relocation put it: 
 
We knew that people would start quitting after six months.  The key thing to 
avoid that was to get back to Manhattan before then.  To be back by the 
beginning of the new fiscal year.  You see, the year ends on March 31, and 
bonuses are paid in the last week of April.  If they were going to receive a 
disappointing bonus, we wanted them to feel they were already making a 
new start. Also, usually if people want to quit, they wait until having their 
bonus. No one threatened explicitly to quit, but I think there was a 
commonly understood agreement. 
 
Informally among themselves, the traders had constructed a deadline.  The construction 
became real in its consequences, forcing the bank to hedge against the possibility that the 
Financial Center might be declared structurally unstable or environmentally unsafe and not 
ready by April.   
 
As with any sophisticated hedging strategy, betting that the Financial Center would be 
ready in time required a counter-balancing bet in the opposite direction – but a relatively 
low-cost one.  The bank reacted to such uncertainty by searching for an alternative trading 
room that could end up as either (1) interim, (2) permanent, or (3) back-up trading room, 
contingent on events that had yet to unfold.   
 
The search for an alternative site took the traders far beyond merely functional 
considerations, forcing them to take into account issues as varied as international politics, 
structural safety, or the width of the building’s stairways.  The traders first considered a 
high floor in a landmark Midtown skyscraper, the Citicorp Building.  But further research 
on the tower revealed that, as the aforementioned executive put it, the building was “about 
the fifth most important terrorist target” in New York: five percent of it was owned by a 
Saudi Prince and was therefore a potential target for Islamic terrorists.  In addition, one of 
the four external columns of the building was exposed (it has since been covered) and the 
traders feared that a terrorist could potentially bring down the building by taking out the 
column.  
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After considering but rejecting a building in Jersey City as too large and too costly, the 
bank finally chose a building in Hoboken, a recently gentrified New Jersey city across from 
the Western shore of Lower Manhattan with convenient access by mass transportation.  The 
office was five minutes away from the World Financial Center by ferryboat, very close to 
Midtown Manhattan by “Path” (a subway-like underground train) and adjacent to the New 
Jersey Amtrak train station.  Seen from the Hudson River as the ferry approaches the New 
Jersey shore, the area does not appear distinguished. Just beyond the waterfront, however, it 
offers an up-and-coming neighborhood of young professionals who work in New York 
City.   
 
The traders’ remaining fear of terrorism made some other features of the building 
particularly attractive.  As one put it, 
 
It is nice that we were able to secure a second floor – a first floor would 
have been ridiculous, but we wanted to be able to go down the stairs and 
leave the building fast if we needed to. The stairwells were wide enough. 
We measured them.  
 
From height to politics, from the width of stairwells to ferryboats, the traders’ relocation 
criteria reflected the wide web of concerns, issues, and constraints that they experienced.   
 
Thus, for several months, the “map” portrayed two sets of arrows, one set pointing to the 
World Financial Center, another pointing to the Hoboken facility (which was rapidly being 
converted into a trading room).  Although there was uncertainty about which of the trading 
rooms they would be moving to, that very ambiguity was a means to reinforce the certainty 
that all the desks would be re-united into one trading room in either case and thus prevent 
the organization from sliding into a dangerous free-fall. 
 
Return to the World Financial Center 
 
 “Thanks – Welcome Back,” read a huge sign next to an enormous American flag over the 
entrance to the World Financial Center as the traders returned to their old trading room in 
March 2002.   In the end, the World Financial Center had re-opened and the hedging 
renovation of the Hoboken facility was justified as a recovery site that would be maintained 
in the event of any future disaster.
6  All the desks were once again together.  In fact, despite 
the six-month displacement to New Jersey, the extra commute, the potential for serious 
conflicts around the Midtown move, the low bonus, and the many other difficulties, not a 
single trader had left the trading room.  International Securities had retained its most 
precious assets.  
 
                                                 
 
6 Across the Hudson River from the WFC, the Hoboken disaster recovery room can be 
reached by ferry.  Tests confirm that it can be fully operative within 30 minutes after an 
evacuation from the WFC room.  Replete with backed-up data and up-to-date computers – 
one for each trader, with the trader’s name marked on top – it is an eerie, unoccupied space.     23 
Although the return was marked by a strong sense of accomplishment, it was also 
accompanied by renewed experience of loss.  Some traders chose not to look down from 
the twentieth floor to the hollow immediately below where workers were still removing 
debris; but none could entirely avoid the broad windows and the extraordinary emptiness 
where the towers once stood.  The trading room was familiar, uncannily so; but the daily 
journey there was now disconcerting.  The Trade Center subway stop had been destroyed 
and the traders had to get off at one or another different station and walk around or 
alongside the WTC site.  Instead of walking past the specialty shops in the old Trade 
Center, now along this ten-minute detour the traders passed numerous impromptu 
memorials.  One, for example, displayed plastic-covered color photos of deceased police 
officers, firefighters, and Trade Center employees with their names and a sign, “Remember 
me” below each.  As the trader walked, he or she confronted a succession of “Remember 
me,”  “Remember me,”  “Remember me.”  Different, but equally upsetting were the tourists 
with their camcorders and gaudy clothes; or the vendors selling memorabilia; or the 
constant presence of so many policemen, both regular and plainclothes; or the construction 
workers with their noise, trucks, diesel fumes, and dust.  If getting back to work was a way 
to put closure to the trauma, the process of just getting to the workplace could be 




In this paper we set out to address the following question: how does an organization cope 
with a sudden and radical change in the world around it? A long tradition of organizational 
literature dating back to the open systems school argues that organizations deal best with 
environmental uncertainty by reproducing it within the organization.  In contrast, the 
sensemaking literature contends that in situations that challenge all prior mental schemas, 
the emphasis should be on protecting and preserving the organization – the team, the firm, 
the factory, the socio-technical unit  – even at the cost of misalignment with the 
environment.  The case of International Securities, an investment bank severely damaged as 
a result of the terrorist attack on September 11
th, speaks to this debate.  
  
The particularities of International Securities prompt another important question: what 
should the role of leaders, and in particular leaders of non-hierarchical organizations,  be in 
situations or extreme crises?  Exceptional circumstances seem to call for strong leadership.  
But heterarchical organizations eschew hierarchy as an organizing principle.  Instead, they 
exploit day-to-day uncertainty by fostering lateral accountability and emergent initiative 
(Lane and Maxfield 1996; Stark 1999).  Should the leader of a heterarchy take absolute 
                                                 
 
7 In organizational terms, the company did not fully recover its capabilities for creative 
association.  The whiteboard where impromptu meetings previously took place was now 
typically empty.  Communication across desks decreased.  Some traders referred to the new 
mood in the trading room as the “Escapaway effect.”  But there were also additional 
factors,  most significantly the change on Wall Street from “bull” to “bear” market.  In a 
bear (i.e., falling) market, mergers are much less frequent, and therefore the potential profit 
opportunities for several desks are scarcer.     24 
control of events, or resist the pressure and preserve the non-hierarchical character of the 
organization?  
 
Our findings suggest that in conditions of extreme crises, organizations should indeed favor  
internal stability. The makeshift trading room, as we saw, began to provide some reduction 
of uncertainty as it provided the means to re-enact identities, hailing first identities as 
patriots and then as traders.  In this, our case is consistent with the sensemaking literature. 
For instance, in the case of the Hungarian detachment described by Weick (1995), the faux 
map was effective not because its leader had superior knowledge or a higher, more 
privileged, and more encompassing vantage point. Instead, the map was a device that could 
help hold the organization together. 
 
On the other hand, our study warns against the difficulties of simple recipes. As we also 
saw, the trading room could not entirely buffer the traders from the environment.  To be a 
trader, a wartime trader, required exposure.  To take positions, to be exposed to risk, meant 
being exposed to the n ews of war.  That news, as well as the continued perception of 
terrorist threat, interacted with other identities, for example, as spouses and parents, whose 
loved ones actually were or potentially would be (depending on where the trading room 
would be located) across a river separated by bridges and tunnels that would surely be 
closed in another attack.  These identities provoked differences between traders whose 
homes were in Manhattan or New Jersey and opened up the black box of the truce in which 
the trading room’s location had been taken-for-granted.  Moreover, as we also saw, by 
providing the conditions for realizing their professional skills, the Escapaway trading room 
came to re-instill more nuanced identities.  How could one be not simply a trader b ut 
specifically a practicing merger arbitrageur if one could not have easy access to the 
Midtown meetings where merger deals were announced? In sum, unlike the San Diego 
sailors studied by Hutchins, the Escapaway traders were not all in one boat. 
 
In such contexts, the function of leaders is to manage the employees’ interpretations of the 
environment in ways that downplay conflict and uncertainty. Leaders do not abandon their 
non-hierarchical style and say to their employees “I know more than you do.” But they can 
hold the organization together to increase the chances that solutions will emerge through 
the interaction of the skills and knowledge of the members of the organization.  
 
Our case suggests that this low-profile leadership style can be extremely  effective. The 
traders at International Securities managed to navigate six months of exile successfully 
without losing a single trader.  They could do so because their leadership provided some 
basic conditions – reducing uncertainty on some dimensions while allowing considerable 
freedom of action along others – which made it possible for the traders themselves to avoid 
frames that would pull them apart. The organization held together through a leadership 
style that managed ambiguities, rebuilt identities, assuaged fears, and restored the initiative 
of organizational actors, creating the conditions for new solutions to emerge. 
 
   25 
REFERENCES 
 
Barsade, Siegal.  2002. "The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion in Groups", forthcoming 
in Administrative Science Quarterly 47(4):644  
 
Bartel, Caroline. 2002. “I Love New York, More Than Ever: Changes in the City's 
Emotional and Behavioral Skyline Following the World Trade Center Terrorist 
Attacks” Journal of Management Inquiry 11 (3) 
 
Beunza, Daniel. 1999. “New Cognitive Practices in the Trading Rooms of Wall Street.” 
Manuscript, Stern School of Business. 
 
Beunza, Daniel and David Stark. 2003. “The Organization of Responsiveness: Innovation 
and Recovery in the Trading Rooms of Lower Manhattan.” Socio-Economic Review 
1(2):135-164. 
 
 __   2004. “Tools of the Trade: The Socio-Technology of Arbitrage in a Wall Street 
Trading Room.” Industrial and Corporate Change 13(2):369-400.  
 
Burns, T. and G. M. Stalker. 1961, The Management of Innovation, London: Tavistock 
 
Callon, Michel.  1998.  “Introduction: Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics.”  
In Callon, ed. The Laws of the Markets.  Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Clark, Gordon L., Maryann P. Feldman, and Meric S. Gertler.  2000.  The Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Geography.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Corbridge, Stuart and Nigel Thrift. eds. 1994.  Money, Power and Space.  London: 
Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Freeman, Steven F., Larry Hirschhorn and Marc Maltz. 2002. “Moral Purpose and 
Organizational Resilience: Sandler, O’Neill & Partners in the Aftermath of 
September 11th, 2001” MIT Working paper. 
 
Girard, Monique and David Stark. 2002. “Distributing Intelligence and Organizing 
Diversity in New Media Projects.”  Environment and Planning A   34 (11) 
(November):1927-49. 
 
Hedberg, B., Paul C. Nystrom, and William H. Starbuck, 1976. "Camping on Seesaws: 
Prescriptions for a Self-Designing Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly 
12(1):  41-65.  
 
Hutchins, Edwin.  1995.  Cognition in the Wild.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1961. The social psychology of organizations. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
   26 
Kelly, John and David Stark. 2002. “Crisis, Recovery, Innovation: Learning from 9/11.” 
Environment and Planning A 34(9) (September):1523-33. 
 
Kendra, James M. and Tricia Wachtendorf.  2003. Elements of Resilience after the World 
Trade Center Disaster: Reconstituting New York City’s Emergency Operations 
Center. Disasters 27(1) 37-53. 
 
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander. 1992.  “Knowledge of the firm, Combinative Capabilities, 
and the Replication of Technology.”  Organization Science 3(3):383-97. 
 
Lane, David, and Robert Maxfield. 1996. “Strategy under complexity: Fostering generative 
relationships.” Long Range Planning 29 (2): 215-31. 
 
Leyshon, Andrew and Nigel Thrift.  1997.  Money/Space: Geographies of Monetary 
Transformation.  London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Martin, Ron. 1999. “The New Economic Geography  of Money.”  In Ron Martin (ed.), 
Money and the Space Economy. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 
 
McKinsey Report - Increasing FDNY's Preparedness McKinsey Report on Fire Department 
New York Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the World Trade Center 
web site: http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.html 
 
Neff, Gina and David Stark.  2003. “Permanently Beta: Responsive Organization in the 
Internet Era.”   Pp. 173-188 in Philip E.N. Howard and Steve Jones, eds., Society 
Online: The Internet In Context.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Perrow, Charles.  2002.  “Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.”  Unpublished manuscript, 
Yale University. 
 
Powell, Walter W. 1996. “Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology 
Industry.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152(1): 197-215. 
 
Reverre, Stephane. 2001. The Complete Arbitrage Deskbook. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Salgado, Susan. 2002. “Next Door to Disaster: How Participant Observation Changed the 
Observer.” Journal of Management Inquiry 11 (3). 
 
Stark, David. 1999.  “Heterarchy: Distributing Intelligence and Organizing Diversity.”  Pp. 
153-179 in John Clippinger, ed., The Biology of Business: Decoding the Natural 
Laws of Enterprise.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Stark, David. 2001. "Ambiguous Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in 
Postsocialist Firms." Pp. 69–104 in  The Twenty-First-Century Firm: Changing 
Economic Organization in International Perspective. Paul DiMaggio, ed. Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 
   27 
Tierney, Kathleen J.  2002.  “Strength of a City: A Disaster Research Perspective on the 
World Trade Center Attack.”  Social Science Research Council, After September 
11
th Archive,  http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/tierney.htm 
 
Weick, Karl. 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2
nd ed. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
 
___.  1993. “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, 628-652. 
 
___.  1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
White, Harrison.  1995.  Identity and Control.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Wolfe, Tom. 1987. The Bonfire of the Vanities. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Wrzesniewski, Amy. 2002. “"It's Not Just a Job": Shifting Meanings of Work in the Wake 
of 9/11.” Journal of Management Inquiry 11 (3) 
 
  